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Regional integration remains among the main topics of international discourse in Central 
Asia, though the progress of international cooperation is very limited. Our aim is to 
understand the connection between the organization of economic institutions in Central Asia 
and the regional integration. The existing literature has explored the state level of integration 
in great detail: varying from rational choice explanations of security dilemma to the studies of 
social construction of the region in Central Asia. This paper, however, provides a firm-
centered perspective on the regional integration. Thus, it first considers how varieties of 
political economies of Central Asian countries influence the regionalization process in the 
region through economic networks established by private actors, and how institutions are 
shaped by regionalization. Second, it considers how political institutions determine the impact 
of informal networks on formal regional integration initiatives, and looks at the potential 
effect of formal regionalism on regionalization process in Central Asia. 
 
 
The paper was written within the framework of the project “Emerging Market Economies in 
Central Asia: The Role of Institutional Complementarities in Reform Process”. The author 
thanks Boris Kheifets and Manuel Stark for helpful comments and suggestions regarding the 
sources of the data. All mistakes remain my own. 
1. Introduction 
 Regional cooperation and integration remains among the main topics of international 
discourse in Central Asia. In fact, though the issue of the regional integration is perceived 
differently for different regions of the former Soviet Union, the overall consensus is that 
increasing regional cooperation could be helpful for Central Asia from the point of view of 
economic development and overcoming common problems. However, in spite of multitude of 
regional cooperation initiatives, both exclusively among Central Asian countries, and 
including both Central Asia and external actors – both post-Soviet and from other regions of 
the world, there is still no evidence of active intergovernmental cooperation in the region. 
Thus, regional integration in the Central Asia is still mostly a vague collection of “ink on 
paper” projects. 
 This paper, however, aims to consider a different perspective on the regional 
integration in Central Asia. It is well known, that the areas of relatively less effective 
regionalism could happen to be quite successful in terms of regionalization, i.e. interaction of 
economic and political actors beyond the formal intergovernmental cooperation across 
national borders. Main elements of the regionalization usually include stable trade networks, 
cross-border investments linking the countries through international chains of production and 
migration. The well-known case of “informal integration” is South East Asia, where foreign 
direct investments of Japanese corporations and cross-border Chinese ethnic business 
networks effectively substitute for lack of formal international integration (Peng, 2000; 
Kawai, 2005). In Africa cross-border trading networks play a similar role: while the official 
intraregional trade is estimated at the level of 6% of the overall foreign trade of the countries 
in the region, the informal trade flows not captured by statistics could reach the level of 30-
50% (Meager, 1997). Similar processes are observed in Southern Asia, although they seem to 
be less developed (Taneja, 2001; Rafi Khan, 2007).  
It is therefore interesting to check whether similar processes could be observed in the 
post-Soviet Central Asia.  This paper focuses on a “firm-centered view” on regional 
integration, considering a firm the main agent of regionalization. We use a “broad” concept of 
firm, including e.g. international networks established by migrants or informal entities. 
Obviously, in this case the “borders” of the firm are weakly defined. Moreover, Breslin 
(2000) empathizes two important caveats with respect to the comparative analysis of regional 
integration of the dimension of “regionalization” is incorporated: first, the borders of regions 
become fuzzy,1 and second, focus on states as political entities to establish relevant 
integration areas is not necessarily correct – in particular, the so-called “microregionalism” 
and “microregionalization”, based on integration of subnational entities, can be very 
important. From the point of view of the first caveat, we define “Central Asia” as five former 
Soviet republics (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan). 
On the one hand, this approach is reasonable because countries of the region share a relatively 
long period of common economic and political history and closed interconnections (one 
should be aware of the fact, that the very existence of the political entities and the nation-
building in Central Asia is strongly influenced by the “national delimitation” policy of the 
Soviet Union in the 1920-1930s, see Abashin, 2007). However, on the other hand, Central 
Asia is still an “emerging region” (Kazantsev, 2005), i.e. its very concept, as well as structure 
of economic and political relations can be subject to re-definitions and turbulences. The 
second caveat is also ambiguous; all Central Asian countries are politically highly centralized 
(Ufer and Troschke, 2006; Leschenko and Troschke, 2006), and do not allow for active 
paradiplomacy of their regions. High political and fiscal centralization definitively does not 
support microregionalism: for example, in China, where microregionalism and  
microregionalization were quite important, they were also was closely related to 
decentralization (Breslin, 2000a). In a similar way, Russia’s regions paradiplomatic activities 
emerged in an environment of high political decentralization (Magone, 2006). But on the 
other hand, geographical dimensions (especially in Kazakhstan) and poor quality of 
transportation (in all countries of the region), as well as internal differences (like those 
between northern and southern Kyrgyzstan) could theoretically contribute to clustering of 
economic activity on the subregional level.  
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section it provides a short account of the 
regionalization process in Central Asia. The third section attempts to incorporate the analysis 
of the regionalization in a broader framework of the political economies of Central Asian 
countries, trying to understand, how their specifics influences the process of regionalization, 
                                                            
1 On the one hand, if one defines region as a cluster of economic and social ties, it obviously does not have any 
well-defined borders, unlike formal regionalism projects. On the other hand, public discourses and social 
sciences may represent the “mental maps” of “imagined” or even “invented regions” (Shenk, 2001; Miller, 
2002). If the analysis of regionalization is focused on qualitative data (e.g. because the quality of statistics is low, 
what is quite likely to be the case for the post-Soviet space - as well as in the developing and transition world in 
general), the “mental maps” of researchers are likely to create biases for the research outcomes and especially 
for the claimed causal links. On the other hand, mental maps of actors (indirectly influenced by academic 
discourse) not only have an impact the perception of regions, but also can indeed influence the processes of 
regionalization and regionalism. 
and to establish a link between regionalization and institutional reforms in Central Asia and 
between regionalization and regionalism. The last section concludes.  
 
2. Regionalization in Central Asia 
2.1. Post-Soviet regionalization and Central Asia 
 In spite of extremely weak intergovernmental cooperation in the post-Soviet space, the 
region currently exhibits a substantial degree of the bottom-up integration. Basically, there are 
four factors contributing to this process. First, Yudanov (2000), Vahtra (2005), Crane et al. 
(2005), Libman and Kheifets (2006), Kuznetsov (2007) and Kheifets and Libman (2008) 
show, that since early 2000s  Russian corporations have been increasingly present in the post-
Soviet countries through takeovers, joint ventures and – recently – greenfield investments. 
The investment expansion of Russian business is only partly registered by official statistics, 
since informal channels and offshore schemes are actively employed. Traditionally three main 
sectors of expansion are oil and gas, metals and mining and telecom, although currently a 
much larger diversification is observed (Libman, 2008). Second, post-Soviet countries are 
closely linked by migration flows: once again, the main destination for the labor migration is 
still Russia (Tyuryukanova, 2005; Ivakhnyuk, 2006). Third, the post-Soviet space is still 
connected through a unity of infrastructure, e.g. in railroad and power utilities sectors, created 
in the Soviet times. Finally, there is still a significant (though permanently declining) degree 
of social integration in the post-Soviet world, manifesting itself in interpersonal networks and, 
above all, Russian as lingua franca for communication (Nasledie Evrazii, 2007). Hence, the 
regionalization in the post-Soviet space seems to be driven partly by the Soviet heritage 
(which may happen to be a “disappearing reality”), and partly by the logic of regionalization 
common for a typical geographical strategy of emerging multinationals (Davidson, 1980, Bell 
and Pennings, 1996). The post-Soviet regionalization seems to be extremely asymmetric and 
clearly centered around Russia as the key market and key source of FDI in the region. 
Interestingly enough, there is no evidence of trade regionalization in the CIS (unlike, e.g., 
Africa, where informal integration is basically trade-driven), what can be attributed to the 
specifics of industrial structure of post-Soviet economies, where (mostly global) trade in 
commodities dominates the trade structure. Nevertheless, after significant decline of the 
1990s the share of intraregional trade in the CIS reached a stable level; there is also evidence 
that the intraregional trade is still “too high” as opposed to gravity models predictions 
(Fidrmuc, Fidrmuc, 2001; Djankov, Freud, 2002; Elborg-Voytek, 2003, de Sousa and 
Lamotte, 2007).2 
From the point of view of this asymmetry regionalization in Central Asia seems to be 
a complex phenomenon. Theoretically, extraregional actors (like Russian corporations) could 
act as a driving force in the regionalization process. For example, in East Asia Japanese and 
(partly) U.S. multinationals seem to contribute to the development of informal regional 
structures (Dobson and Yue, 1997). However, it requires two additional conditions: first, 
companies are present in several countries of the region, and second, their businesses are 
linked to each other. To our knowledge, there are extremely few areas where both conditions 
are satisfied. Two fields where Russian FDI could potentially increase the degree of regional 
interdependence in the Central Asia are telecommunications and power utilities. Currently, 
the “Big Three” Russian mobile service providers are present in all five countries of the 
region (VimpelCom/Altimo in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan, MTS in 
Uzbekistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, and Megafon in Kyrgyz 
Republic) and have already been engaged in tough competition for the most attractive assets. 
In the power utilities the major player is the state-owned RAO UES, which is present in 
Kazakhstan and Tajikistan, as well as potentially in Kyrgyz Republic. Given the fact that the 
energy systems of the post-Soviet countries are still intervened, common actors in energy 
sectors can significantly contribute to regionalization. However, one should be aware of the 
fact that the energy trade in the post-Soviet space decreased in the last few years, and that the 
modes of organization of power utilities in individual Central Asian countries differ 
substantially.  A third field where Russian extraregional actors could potentially become 
agents of regionalization, is oil and gas; however, currently the presence of Russian 
corporations in this sectors is quite limited (although growing).  
Finally, regionalization through external actors - like in the “Greater China” area - is 
sometimes explained by the “intermediary function” accepted by certain regions and countries 
“canalizing” foreign investments and trade in the region (Breslin, 2004). However, developed 
bilateral ties between Russia and post-Soviet countries make the use of these “intermediaries” 
less important. The situation is not unambiguously clear; for example, in October 2006, 
president of the Association of Kazakh investors in Kyrgyzstan Bakhtybek Zheldibaev 
                                                            
2 It means that the counterfactual trade between the countries of the region estimated according to the size of 
their GDP and geographical distance is lower, than the actual trade flows. This, however, still does not imply 
that the intraregional trade is dominant in the trade structure. 
claimed, that, as opposed to foreign investors from other countries, companies from 
Kazakhstan 
 
“… are in a more attractive position. First of all, Kyrgyz and Kazakhs have similar 
language, traditions, beliefs, psychology, reason and think in a similar way. Second, 
we do not need intermediaries. This is our advantage as opposed to European, 
Chinese and Russian investors. Actually, the latter also feel quite good [in the 
Kyrgyz Republic], but we do not feel their pressure now” (Kuz’min, 2007). 
 
Hence, Russian investors are probably not as close to Kyrgyzstan, as those from Kazakhstan, 
but the “distance” is still relatively small. However, as we will show bellow, Kyrgyzstan and 
Kazakhstan seem to develop deep economic relations, which are not present elsewhere; in 
Tajikistan Russian investors are more important, than those from Kazakhstan. One could of 
course speculate as whether increasing presence of Chinese investors will contribute to 
establishment of the “gate regions” to support regionalization through external forces, but the 
outcome is yet to be seen. 
 
2.2. FDI 
A more interesting question is whether one could expect any regionalization driven by 
the intraregional actors. It is clearly not the case in other regions of the CIS (for example, 
there is only vague evidence of some Ukrainian investment activity in Moldova – in 
particular, in Transdniestria, and of Azerbaijan – in Georgia). However, Central Asia is quite 
different, mostly because of the activity of private and semi-private businesses from 
Kazakhstan, which actively explore the Central Asian countries. Though main direction of 
investments for Kazakhstan is still Russia, it is increasingly present in the Central Asian 
region. As of September 30, 2007 Kyrgyz Republic ranks 13 in the overall outward 
investments of Kazakhstan with about 1.3% of total foreign investments of the country (US$ 
481 mln., including US$ 240 mln. FDI). Uzbekistan ranks 20 with US$ 199 mln. (FDI: US$ 
109 mln.), and Tajikistan ranks 21 with US$ 188 mln. (FDI: US$ 24 mln.). Hence, the 
countries seem to be of minor importance for the outward investment activity of Kazakhstan, 
with Russia, US, UK and British Virgin Islands (BVI) being the main targets for outward 
investments. However, one should take into account, that the Central Asian economies are 
relatively small, and hence even limited investment activity of Kazakhstan can become 
crucially important. Indeed, according to the investment statistics of the Kyrgyz Republic, 
Kazakhstan is currently the dominant source of FDI for Kyrgyzstan, accounting for about 
50% of the total investment inflow (see Figure 1). Unfortunately, we do not have data on the 
FDI structure for Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. However, applying the Kazakhstan data on FDI 
and total investments and national data from the balance of payment, one could establish, that 
for Q1-Q3 2007 Kazakhstan accounted for about 21% of total investments and about 4% of 
FDI inflow in the economy of Tajikistan (with Russia being the main investor accounting for 
about 40% of capital inflow).3  One should, however, be aware of the presence of indirect 
investment channels (e.g. via the BVI investments), which have not been captured by the 
statistics above. 
 
 
Figure 1: Share of Kazakhstan in the FDI inflow to Kyrgyz Republic 
Source: governmental statistics of the Kyrgyz Republic 
The low quality of statistical data makes the discussion of case studies of investment 
activity in the region necessary. In what follows we list the main investment projects of 
Kazakhstan in other countries of the region. Most projects we are aware of are implemented 
in Kyrgyz Republic; it could represent the quality of data bias, however, from our point of 
view, reflects the true predominance of Kyrgyzstan-Kazakhstan connection in the 
regionalization processes in Central Asia. 
                                                            
3 Surely, this indicator is extremely questionable. It is well known that direct comparison of outward and inward 
investment flows data from different statistical authorities of the CIS yields substantially different results 
(Vahtra, 2005); moreover, one faces the challenge of separating balance of payment statistics and methodology 
of statistical authorities, which also happen to be different. 
While distinguishing among the areas of FDI activity of Kazakhstan in the region, one 
should point out the banking sector. Successful economic reforms fostering market discipline 
and high standards allowed Kazakhstan to establish a well-functioning banking sector 
outperforming that of most other CIS countries (including, to a certain extend, Russia), 
allowing the banking sector to pursue an active expansion strategy abroad. Currently the main 
holdings of the banks of Kazakhstan in Central Asia include Nacional’nyi Eksportno-
Importnyi Bank (Kyrgyz Republic) owned by TuranAlem (originally purchased by 
Temirbank), Kazkommerzbank Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz Republic) and Kazkommerzbank 
Tajikistan (Tajikistan) owned by Kazkommerz, ATF Bank Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz Republic) 
owned by ATF Bank, FinanceCreditBank (Kyrgyz Republic) owned by the Seimar Alliance 
Financial Corporation and Khalyk Bank Kyrgyzstan (Kyrgyz Republic) owned by 
Kazakhstan People’s Bank. Investments from Kazakhstan account for about 30% of the 
capital of the banking system of Kyrgyzstan being the sole major foreign investor (Abalkina, 
2007:43), and the share of the banks controlled by Kazakh banks may reach 50% of the 
market for banking services (Kuz’min, 2007). Nevertheless, the presence of the banks of 
Kazakhstan in other countries of Central Asia seems to be fairly limited. The state-owned 
Development Bank of Kazakhstan has a representative office in Uzbekistan. 
 There are several other sectors where investors from Kazakhstan achieved relative 
success. In Kyrgyz Republic one should definitively mention the tourist industry, in particular 
the recreation facilities in the Issyk-Kul region (UNDP, 2006:28). The data regarding this 
sector is fragmentary at best; however, the number of objects controlled by Kazakhstan could 
be significant. The most well-known deal is the agreement to pass four facilities to 
Kazakhstan signed in 2001 and ratified in 2008. Nevertheless, it probably covers only the top 
of the iceberg. In March 2008 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic announced its plan to 
construct a new road connecting Almaty and Cholpon-Ata at Issyk-Kul, which, however, is 
still very far from implementation. For sure a clear advantage is the geographic proximity of 
the region to Almaty, increasing the potential market for the tourist services for customers 
from Kazakhstan. 
Further sectors of the investments from Kazakhstan include mining, construction and 
media industries, as well as real estate. In Kyrgyz Republic Kazakh companies control the 
Kant Cement and Slate Plant, maize syrup plant, two concrete plants, Tokmok Brick Plant, 
Kadamjai Stibium Plant, Tokmok Wool Processing Plant, Kyrgyzenergoremont in Bishkek, 
and participate in the development of gold deposits at Jeruy (Visor Holding) and Taldy Bulak 
(Sammergold). In Tajikistan KazInvestMineral acquired the Adrasman mining complex in 
2006 for US$ 3.2 mln. In the field of gas supply Kazakhstan’s state owned KazTransGaz and 
Kyrgyz Kyrgyzgaz established a joint stock company KyrKazGaz in 2004 to operate the gas 
pipelines to the North of Kyrgyzstan and the South of Kazakhstan. As in the CIS in general, 
the dominant instrument is still acquisition of existing assets, though there is increasing 
presence of greenfield investments (like the recently initiated project of a 
ferrosilicoaluminium plant in Tash-Kumar (Kyrgyz Republic) for US$ 100 mln.) Finally, 
Kazakhstan seems to be extremely interested in power utilities in Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan (in January 2008 Kazakhstan declared its plans to participate in the reconstruction 
of the Kambarada Power Plant in Kyrgyzstan, and in February – in the reconstruction of the 
Rogun Power Plant in Tajikistan); however, any perspectives in this field are still vague, 
especially given active position of Russian RAO UES in the area. The investment activity 
seems to be driven by both relatively cheap labor (as opposed to Kazakhstan) and access to 
natural resources. Access to markets seems to be less important in this sector (unlike banking 
services).  
The opposite direction of investments from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz 
Republic to Kazakhstan seems to be insignificant. In the first 9 months of 2007 Uzbekistan 
accounted for about 0.004% of total FDI inflow to Kazakhstan (or 11% from the CIS),4 and 
Kyrgyz Republic for .008% (or about 22% from the CIS). There is no data on investment 
activity of Tajikistan, as well as cross-border investments in Central Asia beyond Kazakhstan. 
To conclude, it looks like the Central Asian regionalization is as asymmetric, as the 
regionalization process in the CIS in general, with Kazakhstan as the main source of outward 
investments and Kyrgyz Republic as the main recipient of FDI. In Tajikistan investments 
from Kazakhstan are important but less active, than those of Russia (in the Kyrgyz Republic 
the situation is exactly the opposite). Uzbekistan and (especially) Turkmenistan are much less 
active in the development of intraregional investment ties.  
 
2.3. Intraregional trade and migration 
In case of the intraregional trade the situation is similar to the CIS in general. Regional 
concentration of exports is characteristic to a certain extend for the Kyrgyz Republic mostly 
because of its closed economic ties to Kazakhstan. On the other hand, Tajikistan and Kyrgyz 
                                                            
4 There are currently 96 enterprises with Kazakh investments functioning in Uzbekistan, including trade, 
construction, light industry, metals and food industry, and 715 small and medium enterprises with Uzbek 
investments in Kazakhstan, including trade, manufacturing, food industry, construction materials, glass, services 
and real estate operations (RIA Novosti, 2008, April 21). However, the quality of these data is very low and is 
hardly helpful for understanding the scope of international cooperation. 
Republic experience a certain degree of concentration of imports in the region (see Table 1). 
However, a slightly different result follows from the cluster analysis based on dissimilarity 
matrix (Figure 2). While Kazakhstan seems to have higher degree of market integration with 
Russia, than with the rest of the CIS, Kyrgyz Republic and Tajikistan indeed belong to one 
cluster. An additional factor potentially supporting the regionalization is that Central Asian 
countries share a number of common problems of infrastructure, in particular for energy trade 
and water supply, where their economies are closely linked to each other (Vinokurov, 2007). 
Even if the value of trade is small, its importance for the development is crucial. 
 
Table 1: Structure of interregional and intraregional trade in Central Asia, 2006 
From 
(exports), to 
(imports) 
Indicator To (exports), from (imports) 
Kazakhstan Kyrgyz 
Rep. 
Turkmenistan Tajikistan Uzbekistan Total 
Central 
Asia 
Kazakhstan Share of 
total exports 
 0.700% 0.054% 0.412% 1.006% 2.171% 
Kazakhstan Share of 
CIS exports 
 4.804% 0.371% 2.824% 6.902% 14.901% 
Kazakhstan Share of 
total imports 
 0.587% 0.560% 0.117% 1.348% 2.611% 
Kazakhstan Share of 
CIS imports 
 1.255% 1.199% 0.250% 2.884% 5.589% 
Kyrgyz Rep. Share of 
total exports 
20.476%  0.264% 3.010% 3.513% 27.264% 
Kyrgyz Rep. Share of 
CIS exports 
42.902%  0.554% 6.306% 7.361% 57.124% 
Kyrgyz Rep. Share of 
total imports 
11.628%  0.105% 0.163% 3.783% 15.679% 
Kyrgyz Rep. Share of 
CIS imports 
20.161%  0.182% 0.283% 6.559% 27.185% 
Tajikistan Share of 
total exports 
1.987% 0.801% 0.007%  4.818% 7.613% 
Tajikistan Share of 
CIS exports 
14.938% 6.018% 0.054%  36.217% 57.227% 
Tajikistan Share of 
total imports 
10.838% 1.631% 3.501%  10.223% 26.193% 
Tajikistan Share of 
CIS imports 
16.976% 2.555% 5.483%  16.012% 41.026% 
Source: CIS Statistical Committee, 2007 
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Figure 2: Clusters of intraregional trade in the CIS, 2006 
Notes: cluster analysis using Ward clustering method. Dissimilarity matrix defines dissimilarity as 1 minus share 
of trade turnover between countries i and j in the overall trade turnover of the country i in the CIS, prices of 
export applied 
Source: own calculation based on CIS Statistical Committee database, 2007 
 
However, in spite of relatively low international trade, it seems likely that individual markets 
for consumer goods in the region are highly integrated. Grafe et al. (2005) show that the 
impact of border on price variation between Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan is 
relatively small and practically equivalent to the intranational price variation between 
individual regions. It, however, does not imply that internal markets are integrated – only that 
the border effect for disintegration is less relevant. Therefore one could probably assume that 
the integration on the level of small business networks is much higher, than for commodities 
(which play the crucial role in determining the structure of trade statistics presented above).  
Spechler (2000:7) claims that “with all the problems, informal trade among the Central Asian 
countries appears to be working reasonably well”. Informal trade seems to be important for 
countries like Tajikistan (Olimova et al., 2006) and even Turkmenistan in spite of strong trade 
restrictions (in particular across the border with Uzbekistan) (Badykova, 2006). One should 
however bear in mind, that the emerging informal trade networks often span outside the 
Central Asian region over the whole Eurasian continent (Evers and Kaiser, 2000; Kaiser, 
2002). 
Finally, the last issue to be considered is the labor migration in Central Asia. Once 
again, Kazakhstan acts partly as a regional leader attracting migrants (although Russia still 
remains the most important partner for the majority of the CIS countries from the point of 
view of migration – although there is an increasing evidence of competition between these 
two countries for the labor force). As in case of the FDI activity, increasing labor migration in 
Kazakhstan is also a relatively recent phenomenon, directly related to the economic success of 
the country in the last half decade. The main countries of origin for labor migration to 
Kazakhstan are Uzbekistan and Kyrgyz Republic; the migration is partly driven by a 
relatively large ethnic Kazakh minority in Uzbekistan. Although Kazakhstan implements a 
policy of privileged ethnic immigration of the oralman (ethnic Kazakhs), there seems to be a 
significant flow of illegal labor migration exceeding the official migration. The number of 
labor migrants from Uzbekistan in Southern Kazakhstan (which seems to be the most 
attractive region for migration inflows) varies between 200,000 and 1 million; however, the 
any data is likely to be extremely biased and is to be considered with great caution. Some 
authors point out the existence of labor migration from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyz Republic, 
generating a remittance flow, but it seems to be relatively small (Mogilevsky, 2004:27). The 
migration flows have a heavy impact on both legal and illegal monetary flows of migrant 
remittances (Sadovskaya, 2005, 2006). In case of Tajikistan Russia remains the absolutely 
dominant country from the point of view of labor migration. Hence, for informal trade and 
migration the “microregionalization” involving selected regions and areas of the countries is 
probably relevant (however, one should not forget, that Southern Kazakhstan is not only 
geographically close to other countries of the region, but has also a relatively high level of 
economic development). 
 
2.4. Preliminary conclusions 
 To conclude, one indeed can observe certain features of regionalization in Central 
Asia, but their impact is rather limited. There is some evidence of increasing presence of 
business groups from Kazakhstan in Kyrgyz Republic, which increased dramatically in the 
last years. The main driving force of regionalization is the banking sector; recently public 
structures (like KazTransGaz or Kazyna, currently developing a joint investment fund with 
Kyrgyzstan5) also became increasingly important. Even as opposed to the regionalization via 
FDI of Russian corporations in the CIS, which basically started in 2000, the regionalization 
via FDI of businesses from Kazakhstan in Central Asia is still a very recent phenomenon with 
only few years of experience and strongly depends on economic performance of Kazakhstan. 
However, a significant driving force for integration seems to be formed by informal networks 
interconnecting Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan and only partly visible for 
official statistics. In this case regionalization is a much older phenomenon embedded in the 
traditional economic ties in the region. Moreover, it seems to be by far more developed, than 
in the CIS in general (with only few exceptions involving separatist regions like 
Transdniestria, Abkhazia, Southern Osetia and Nagorny Karabakh, which also rely on 
informal trade). Thus, Central Asia combines both “investment regionalization model” of 
South East Asia and the CIS (Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic) and “informal trade 
regionalization model” of West Africa and South Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and 
Uzbekistan). Given the significant size of the shadow economy in Kazakhstan (Schneider 
(2007) estimates it at 44.6% of official GDP for 2004/05), Kyrgyz Republic (40.6%) and 
Uzbekistan (35.4%), the role of informal trade can be significant, though diminishing given 
rapid economic growth in the region (especially in Kazakhstan). Less reliable estimates of 
shadow economy in Tajikistan exceed 60% of official GDP (Lenta.ru, 2007, June 27); 
however, the participation of the country in the regionalization processes is significantly 
smaller and the relative impact of Russia as an extraregional economic partner higher than for 
other countries. The role of Turkmenistan in the regionalization processes is negligibly small. 
The development of regionalization definitively exceeds that of regionalism and “top-
down” integration.  The investment-led regionalization, however, is as asymmetric, as in the 
CIS in general with Kazakhstan being the main actor in the system. Finally, both investment-
led and informal trade regionalization processes should be rather interpreted as collection of 
(probably) interrelated “microregionalization processes” connecting individual countries and  
even region rather than a unified process spreading out all over the Central Asia. 
 However, the most important problem is not just to establish the existence and forms 
of regionalization, but also to understand its interconnection with the institutional 
development in the region. Regionalization often occurs at the corners of development 
spectrum: it can become crucially important for economies at the low level of development, 
substituting for the deficit of the rule of law, but it can also follow from high development, 
                                                            
5 A similar fund was established with Tajikistan 
with high governance capacity of non-governmental agents. In both cases effects of 
regionalization on institutions can differ. For example, in Medieval Europe merchant guilds 
effectively supported the de-facto integration of the economic space and overcame the low 
development of formal institutions (Greif, 2006), but also engaged in redistributive activities 
and market monopolization (Ogilvie, 2007). In what follows we are going to consider three 
channels of interaction between institutions and corporate integration: (1) how the forms of 
the informal integration depend upon the institutions of Central Asian countries; (2) how does 
the regionalization process influence the institutional development and (3) how does the 
regionalization relate to the development of regionalism in the region. The following section 
discusses these three questions extensively. 
 
3. Regionalization and institutions: channels of interdependence 
3.1. Regionalization and reform strategies 
 In spite of economic and political similarities, the countries of Central Asia 
experienced a variety of alternatives of economic and political reforms. It seems to be 
reasonable to assume that the paths of these reforms (and, hence, of established political 
economies) have a significant impact on the patterns of participation (or non-participation) of 
individual countries in the regionalization process.6 From the point of view of different 
patterns of regionalization the most interesting distinction is that between Kazakhstan and 
Uzbekistan. Both countries from the point of view of their economic potential, resource 
endowment and position in traditional economic ties in the region could theoretically act as a 
center for emergence of regional multinationals as the driving force for “investment-led” 
regionalization. Uzbekistan actually outperformed Kazakhstan in the early 1990s, giving rise 
to the discussions of the nature of an “Uzbek paradox” (Spechler et al., 2004). However, since 
early 2000s Kazakhstan performs significantly better, than Uzbekistan, in terms of economic 
growth. So why did Kazakhstan, and not Uzbekistan turn into the main driving force of the 
regionalization in Central Asia? 
 Basically, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan implemented substantially different reform 
strategies. Kazakhstan followed the path of relatively fast transformation establishing market 
institutions. Major economic reforms implemented in the country include i.e. extremely 
favorable policy towards foreign investors (in fact, Kazakhstan remained an absolute leader 
from the point of view of per capita inward FDI in the CIS until recently), liberalization of 
                                                            
6  Obviously, a detailed discussion of institutions in individual countries of the region goes far beyond the 
objectives of this paper; therefore we will provide only stylized facts regarding this issue. 
energy market, privatization of housing and communal sector and reforms of the pension 
system. However, in the mid 2000s Kazakhstan moved towards a more protectionist policy, 
including severe restrictions on FDI for foreign companies (and resulting into the de facto 
nationalization of several assets) and establishment of more active industrial policy in form of 
the so-called “cluster initiative”. However, one should not forget, that in spite of the 
advancements in the field of the formal institutions, the informal power structures in the 
economy in Kazakhstan, as in other CIS countries (like Russia and Ukraine) supported the 
development of privileged business groups with strong ties to the government and political 
support as the main source of competitiveness, with the family of the president in control of 
the most attractive assets (Olcott, 2002). Uzbekistan, on the other hand, followed a more 
gradual approach to economic reforms, resulting into persistence of significant public sector, 
strong governmental interventions and low development of formal market institutions. The 
privatisation in Uzbekistan was limited, and the government maintained strict control over 
international economic relations (see also Figure 3 for some indicators of institutional quality 
in both countries).  
 
Figure 3: Average governance indicators (right) and average transition indicators (left) in the Central 
Asian countries 
Source: for governance: World Bank Governance indicators; reported is the unweighted average of six indicators 
calculated by the World Bank on the scale from 0 (bad governance) to 100 (good governance); for transition: 
EBRD Transition Report 2007; reported is the unweiteghted average of ten indicators calculated by the EBRD 
on the scale from 1 (no transition) to 4 (successful development of market institutions) 
 
So, the model of institutional development in Kazakhstan seems to form a better foundation 
for regionalization, than in Uzbekistan.  One should mention three main “channels” of 
influence of the institutional reforms in Kazakhstan on the regionalization model: 
1. Kazakhstan carried out a very successful banking reform, including the privatization 
of practically all banking structures, the improvement of quality of the banking system 
leading to significant reduction of number of banks (by four times from 1993 to 2002), a 
relatively early introduction of the IFRS/IAS, deposit insurance system (1999) and opening 
the financial services market for foreign investors. On the other hand, unlike Russia, banks 
still control substantial industrial business groups. Successful development of private banking 
sector allowed the banks of Kazakhstan to initiate the international investment expansion, and 
become important forces for the regionalization.  
2. In the political-economic environment like that of the Central Asian countries, 
successful regionalization basically requires two contradicting conditions. On the one hand, 
one of the problems of the state-led economies in a region with a very low level of political 
cooperation is that political difficulties actually prevent the development of economic ties. So, 
if the connection between economic and political actors are formal and too strong – like in 
case of the state-owned economy of Uzbekistan – political differences can effectively block 
any economic cooperation. On the other hand, an environment with poor protection of 
property rights is problematic for small private companies with substantial public support. 
The model of large privileged business groups implemented in Kazakhstan seemed to be quite 
successful from this point of view.7 Moreover, the businesses of this group are large enough 
to successfully establish their presence in neighboring states, but also have experience of 
turbulent economic environments, which gives them a unique advantage vis-à-vis 
multinationals from developed countries. 
3. The timing of development seems to be crucial. Gradual reforms are likely to reduce 
pressure at the stage of recession, but rapid reforms and development of market institutions 
could lead to better performance after the recession stage. However, any regionalization in the 
post-Soviet space became possible only after a certain period of time, when the initial 
problems of nation-building preoccupying political elites became weaker. From that point of 
view Kazakhstan also had better chances to become leader of the regionalization in Central 
Asia, than Uzbekistan. 
 The transition strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic was quite similar to that of Kazakhstan 
(see also Figure 3): in fact, Kyrgyzstan was considered an “exemplary” case of market 
reforms in the early 1990s (being one of the first countries in the post-Soviet region to enter 
the WTO). However, economic reforms in the country seem to be far lest consequent and 
persistent. Kyrgyz Republic also developed the power-property system where the family of 
                                                            
7 It should be noted, that the links is more complicated than a simple statement that “market reforms ensure 
leadership in the regionalization process”. In fact, it was the exactly the combination of reforms with the 
development of large business groups which had a positive impact. 
the president seemed to control the main assets in the republic (Spector, 2008). However, the 
last several years were characterized by increasing political instability with negative effects 
for the economic development. Generally speaking, economic development in Kyrgyzstan 
have been by far less successful, than in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan; according to the 
Conference Board and Groningen Growth and Development Center, Total Economy Database 
(2007), Kyrgyz Republic belongs to the main losers of transition, with GDP per capita in 
2005 accounting for only 66% of the GDP per capita in 1974 (the second worst performance 
after Moldova).8 On the one hand, lack of natural resources seems to have contributed to 
economic decline, on the other hand, however, economic reforms were, though large (as 
opposed to other post-Soviet countries), still limited, also probably because of deficit of 
resources and economic decline.  From the point of view of this paper to aspects should be 
pointed out. First, bad economic performance significantly contributed to the persistence of 
“informal trade” regionalization and development of labor migration: similar forces were at 
work in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and partly Turkmenistan. Second, although the political and 
economic instability seemed to have a negative effect on the FDI inflow per se (and also is an 
important problem for Kazakhstan), Kazakh investors were relatively less affected by the 
problems, than multinationals from developed countries and probably even Russian investors 
(who, however, were quite successful in using the “turbid water” environment). Hence, the 
instability, while having an absolutely negative effect on the investors from Kazakhstan, 
increased their relative weight.9 Moreover, similarities in the institutional structure may also 
enhance the presence of investors from Kazakhstan. 
 In case of Tajikistan the implementation of economic reforms was also delayed; 
however, unlike other countries of the region, the main reason for low quality of governance 
was the civil war of the early 1990s and the consequences of this conflict. It seems possible to 
argue, that Russia’s position during the civil war ensured the current status of Russian 
investors as the dominant group in Tajikistan; however, recent developments indicate, that 
strengthening the stability of the current political regime in the country at the same time 
weakens the unambiguous support for Russian investors (Abalkina et al., 2007), and therefore 
opens a window of opportunity for other players, including Kazakhstan. Finally, in 
Turkmenistan economic and political reforms have been negligible; on the contrary, the 
                                                            
8 All data refers to the GDP in PPP. 
9 It is not impossible that there is also some absolutely positive effect; for example, in several regions of the CIS 
several groups of Russian investors were able to enter the markets because of low quality of institutions 
(Libman, 2007), and similar logic may be present here. However, we do not have any (even anecdotal) evidence 
for this hypothesis. 
current regime effectively restricted any contacts with foreign actors (even at the personal 
level). Hence, the only form of participation in the regionalization processes, both possible 
and – given the low quality of livelihood – necessary was the informal trade, which, as 
indicated, seemed to have at least a certain impact. 
 
 
3.2. Impact of Regionalization on Economic Institutions 
 Regionalization is not only a strategy used because of a certain system of institutions, 
but also a factor influencing the development of institutions. The effects of regionalization can 
be both strengthening the market-enhancing institutions and conserving the inefficient 
institutional structure. However, these effects also differ for the “investment driven” 
regionalization and “informal trade” regionalization. From the point of view of the investment 
driven regionalization two arguments should be mentioned. First, investment driven 
regionalization (as well as developed labor migration) strengthens institutional competition, 
i.e. competition between countries for mobile factors of production by establishing legal 
environment and economic policies. Institutional competition is often considered to be an 
efficient tool of taming the Leviathanic rent-seeking government and of revealing the 
preferences for institutions through the evolutionary learning process (Vaubel, 2007). Second, 
multinationals are likely to act as channels of transmission of best practices and knowledge 
between countries, thus supporting the diffusion of efficient institutions. In a similar way, best 
practices can be important through the networks of labor migration. 
 Unfortunately, both positive effects are not unambiguous. On the one hand, 
institutional competition is not necessarily driven by demand for good institutions. In fact, the 
literature on the post-Soviet transition established a variety of factors leading to inefficient 
equlibria supported by the demand for bad institutions. Reasons for these “institutional traps” 
include redistribution effects, learning costs, deficit of trust, as well as interaction between 
formal and informal institutions (for a survey see Libman, 2007). This is definitively related 
to the emergence and stability of the “clan capitalism” (Kosals, 2006) in the post-Soviet 
world. The main question is actually not whether demand for bad institutions really exists, but 
rather whether it is permanent (i.e. constitutes a stable equilibrium) or temporary (and after a 
certain period of development should be replaced by demand for good institutions). 
Havrylyshin (2007:17) refers to this discussion as “transition inevitable” and “transition 
frozen” school of thoughts and claims, that “the debate … will certainly go on for some time 
to come”. From the point of view of regionalization in the CIS space the results are 
ambiguous: both factors of demand for good institutions and demand for bad institutions seem 
to be present (Libman, 2007).  
From the point of view of the Central Asian countries the problem is as ambiguous, as 
in the CIS in general. Actually, it receives an additional dimension given relatively high 
degree of political instability in several countries of the region (like Kyrgyz Republic and 
Tajikistan). It is clear that the increase of investments from Kazakhstan and Russia does not 
necessarily coincide with stronger demand for transparency and general rules in the Hayekian 
sense. In fact, demand for privileged relations with regional authorities may be more 
important, and the “threshold level” of demand for institutions necessary to enter the market 
for the post-Soviet companies is not so high anyway. Hence, foreign investments may well 
support inefficient equilibria. For sure they support the semi-authoritarian regimes in the 
countries of Central Asia, which, in turn, are one of the main factors of the existing low 
quality of governance (Libman, 2007a).10 However, the alternative to this support may be not 
market-enhancing reforms (like in the countries of the Western flank of the CIS), but chaos 
and disorder. The second channel of the impact of informal integration on economic 
institutions seems to be even more important in the region. In fact, in spite of its own 
institutional deficits, Kazakhstan can become an important source of “good practices” for the 
countries of the region. Once again, unlike the Western flank of the CIS, there are hardly any 
viable alternatives (like investments of multinationals from developed countries). 
Nevertheless, this transmission of good practices is per se limited by the quality of institutions 
in the country of origin of investments, making the very issue of institutional advancements 
crucially dependant from reforms in the leading country. Given the extremely short 
experience of the investment led regionalization in the region, it is still difficult to make any 
conclusions.11 
The effects of informal trade regionalization are also not unambiguous. As already 
mentioned, most forms of the informal regionalization appear in an environment of weak 
formal institutions; to a certain extend, they serve as an instrument of overcoming this 
problem. From this point of view informal trade networks serve as a natural instrument of 
establishing an order for economic transactions. However, in this case their advantages and 
disadvantages are similar to the general discussion on the role of informal economy: on the 
                                                            
10 Moreover, as already noticed, strengthening these regimes can effectively result in a hold up of foreign assets 
and decline of regionalization in general. 
11 It is definitively necessary to differentiate between different groups of businesses and their strategies. The shift 
from demand for bad institutions to demand for good institutions is likely to depend upon these differences. 
Similar points are valid for Central Asia. Our paper therefore provides a rather simplified view, which is, 
however, helpful for the basic hypotheses development.  
one hand, it overcomes the deficits of formal rules and makes economic transactions possible, 
but on the other hands, informal rules are less efficient (e.g. because of their personalized 
nature vis-à-vis formal abstract rules) and, more importantly, establish behavioral patterns 
preventing introduction of formal rules in the future. A possible strategy in like with the ideas 
of Hernando de Soto is to develop formal rules consistent with informal rules, but it is always 
a difficult task (also from the point of view of incentive-compatibility for political decision 
makers). Therefore the existence of informal trade regionalization may constitute a constraint 
optimum in a given environment, but is able to become an obstacle for the development of 
efficient reforms in the future. 
 
3.3. Regionalization and regionalism 
The last point we address in this paper is the relation between regionalization and 
regionalism. As already noted, there have been numerous attempts of top-down integration in 
Central Asia, mostly without any visible results. Even the most basic form of regional 
cooperation – the FTA – is quite problematic. Although there exists a (highly incomplete) 
network of bilateral trade agreements in Central Asia (see Table 2), there are huge 
implementation problems; countries quite often act unilaterally, restricting the trade relations 
in case of economic or political turbulences. Economic interdependence in the area of water 
or energy resources has also caused permanent redistribution conflicts over the common pool. 
Multilateral integration has been even more problematic. Basically, it is reasonable to 
distinguish between three main groups of regional projects: special projects for the Central 
Asian region, participation of the countries of the region in the post-Soviet integration and 
participation in larger integration projects, where countries of Central Asia form a substantial 
group of participants. In this paper I focus on the first group, where the interaction between 
regionalization and regionalism is the most relevant issue. 
Table 2: Bilateral FTA in central Asia 
 Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Rep. Tajikistan Turkmenistan Uzbekistan 
Kazakhstan X 1995 yes  1997 
Kyrgyz Rep. 1995 X   1998 
Tajikistan yes  X  1996 
Turkmenistan    X 1996 
Uzbekistan 1997 1998 1996 1996 X 
Source: Kort and Dragneva, 2006: 9 
The first project involving the countries of Central Asia was the Central Asian Union, 
established by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan in 1994. In 1998 Tajikistan was 
formally admitted to the Union, and in 2001 the structure was renamed as the Organization of 
Central Asian Cooperation (OCAC). In spite of declarations of the organization to develop a 
regime for a full-scale economic and political cooperation, OCAC remained a more or less 
vague forum without any results (Kuz’min, 2008), finally leading to the integration of the 
organization in the Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC). However, the idea of a Central 
Asian Union is still part of the agenda of the main players in the region. While the old OCAC 
failed to function also because of the rivalry between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, in the new 
round of negotiations Kazakhstan became the main promoter of the institutionalized regional 
integration. In 2007 Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic agreed on establishing an institutional 
framework for the bilateral agreement between these two countries – an initiative considered 
to be the first step towards a new regional integration project. Tajikistan is also considered to 
be a potential partner in the new structure (Zhugan, 2007). Nevertheless, is still very difficult 
to assess the potential viability of a new structure. 
Once again, investment led and informal trade regionalization can have different 
influence on the regionalism in Central Asia. From the point of view of the former, the most 
often stated argument is that economic dominance of Kazakhstan based on the investment 
expansion of its corporations can become a factor supporting formal regionalism in its current 
form (once again, with Kazakhstan as the main actor). Regionalization can become an 
additional leverage mechanism. The increasing attention of the Kazakhstan government to the 
FDI activity in the Kyrgyz Republic confirms that at least these expectations are present at the 
level of the political decision makers. Nevertheless, international experience shows, that the 
asymmetric regionalization can have different impact on regionalism: while in Mexico the 
development of maquiladoras actually supported the formation of NAFTA, in the CIS 
significant presence of Russian investors in Ukraine did not support any formal integration 
between these two countries.  
Considering the link between investment-led regionalization and regionalism, one 
should not forget the potential importance of political institutions in the regional integration 
processes. As noted, most countries of the region are semi-authoritarian regimes, where 
governments use the design of economic institutions to restrict potential opposition. It is well 
known in the literature on international integration, that non-democracies are less likely to 
participate in the regional economic integration than democracies (Mansfield et al., 2002). In 
fact, that is what one can observe in Central Asia: in fact, the less democratic countries of the 
region (Turkmenistan and – to a lower extend – Uzbekistan) are also less likely to become 
part of integration agreements. The main problem is the issue of commitment: in a political 
system based on informal power balances it is extremely difficult to provide any commitment 
to an external actor, yet alone to give up part of the sovereignty (what is per definition implied 
by the regionalization). A question is of course whether regionalization can overcome these 
obstacles. Basically, there are two factors to be taken into consideration. First, regional 
cooperation can take form of the development of international hierarchies (Lake, 2007), and 
in this case is less dependent from the issue of democracy. An important aspect from this 
point of view is not just the existence of asymmetries, but the scope of asymmetries. Weak 
asymmetry can in fact be even quite dangerous for regionalism: it increases mistrust, but does 
not provide any instruments for leverage. In fact, the political elites in Kyrgyz Republic have 
been quite cautious with respect to any potential integration with Kazakhstan. However, high 
political instability is a clear factor increasing the asymmetries and also the demand for 
international hierarchies. Second, the question is whether there is a clear link between 
investment expansion and governmental policies. Once again, in case of Russian investments 
in Ukraine businesses basically ignore the regionalism dimension. However, given a 
relatively high influence of consolidated political leadership in Kazakhstan on its business 
groups, one could in fact expect that the government will be able to influence the investment 
decisions following the logic of international politics. Hence, one can actually expect that in 
case of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz Republic regionalization could support formal regionalism. 12  
Obviously, the scope of these projects mostly covers Kazakhstan and Kyrgyz 
Republic, and maybe Tajikistan (where the position of Russia is crucial). Uzbekistan has been 
quite reluctant to support regionalism in Central Asia (Bohr, 2004; Kuz’min, 2008), and in the 
current situation seems to prefer Russia to Kazakhstan as the main source of FDI, designing 
its investment policies respectively (Abalkina et al., 2007; Kheifets and Libman, 2008). The 
latter fact raises an important issue of competition between Central Asian regionalism 
projects and broader projects (with participation of Russia – EAEC – or China – Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization). And in this context development of regionalization can also be 
quite important: on the one hand, strong economic interconnections can make regional 
integration within Central Asia a priority; but on the other hand, it is possible, that at least 
some actors try to off-balance economic influence of Kazakhstan by the political influence of 
                                                            
12 It is important to notice, that the main players in the economy of Kazakhstan are, though highly connected to 
the government, still private businesses. There is no trend towards wide-scope nationalization in Kazakhstan, as 
it was observed in Russia. This is an additional argument in favor of the regionalism projects: in case of 
dominance of state-owned enterprises regionalization can effectively become just another form of 
intergovernmental contacts, making any form of further cooperation meaningless (Vinokurov, 2007a). 
other actors (e.g. Russia). Theoretically, it is also reasonable to claim that the development of 
Central Asian regionalism is able to reinforce the regionalization, reducing the degree of 
political uncertainty and removing existing borders. The crucial factor is here whether the 
regionalism will move from rhetoric to implementation. The effects of pure rhetoric (as it has 
been so far in the field of regionalism in Central Asia) are ambiguous: it can both create 
necessary framework for public support of investment expansion (what seems to be the case 
for Kazakhstan-Kyrgyz Republic dyad (Kuz’min, 2008)), but also introduce political tensions 
in purely economic relations. 
From the point of view of informal trade one can hardly expect any clear effects of 
regionalization on regionalism and vice versa. Informal trade supports the persistence of 
social integration and cross-border interpersonal networks, necessary for any integration 
project. On the other hand, increasing intergovernmental cooperation could theoretically shift 
the patterns of informal trade to formal trade by creating well-protected property rights and 
restricting rent-seeking of public officials through removing additional options for their 
decision-making (it is actually implied by any economic liberalization). From this point of 
view the very existence of informal trade is based on the lack of formal framework for 
cooperation – once again, very similar to the issue of the informal economy in general. 
Whether this degree of cooperation (and of quality of governance in general) can be achieved, 
is questionable. A reasonable point often mentioned by sociologists is that the real puzzle is 
not why some people prefer informal structures, but why there are people choosing the 
formalization of their transactions (Paneyakh, 2008). In a region with decades-old traditions 
of informal economy (in fact, flourishing even under late Soviet regime) even changes of 
formal institutions may have no effect on behavioral patterns for the actors. 
 
4. Conclusion 
 In spite of the widely recognized need for cross-border cooperation in Central Asia 
(Gleason, 2001), the last fifteen years provided evidence for extremely low degree of top-
down regionalism. Although integration rhetoric has been used quite often (especially in 
Kazakhstan), there is no sign of any more or less important integration achievements. Most 
countries prefer designing their policy unilaterally, leading to numerous conflicts, especially 
in the field of common pool resources (like water or energy). That is why it is interesting to 
look at yet another dimension of regional cooperation, which allows for independent action of 
non-state agents. In fact, we have tried to show that there are at least some elements of 
regionalization present in Central Asia. Basically, regionalization takes two forms. First, 
countries of the region seem to be interconnected by the networks of informal trade, based on 
the long-term past experience. Second, recent economic success of Kazakhstan has allowed 
this country to become an important center for development of regional multinationals and 
FDI, particularly important for Kyrgyz Republic, as well as act as a center of attraction for 
labor migration.  
 The patterns of regionalization seem to be heavily influenced by the development of 
institutions in Central Asian countries. In particular, the model of more liberal reforms 
combined with still-persistent links between influential business groups and politics seems to 
be a “success combination” for the multinationals from Kazakhstan (as opposed to 
Uzbekistan). The impact of regionalization on institutional development is, however, 
ambiguous: on the one hand, it can serve as a link for transmission of “best practices” and 
reinforce better property rights, but on the other hand, the positive impact is limited by 
institutional deficits for the economy of Kazakhstan.  Finally, in Central Asia regionalization 
could potentially support the regionalism development, though the expectations are also 
unclear. 
 Since we are dealing with a relatively recent process, it is difficult to make clear 
predictions regarding the future of the regionalization in Central Asia. Probably, there is no 
reason to expect any decline of cross-border informal trade, given lack of reforms in poor 
quality of governance in most countries of the region. It is the economic prosperity and 
freedom which could effectively shift the patterns of trade to the formal sector – but there is 
no reason to expect these changes. On the other hand, the development of other forms of 
regionalization – FDI expansion from Kazakhstan and increasing labor migration to this 
country – crucially depends on economic performance of Kazakhstan. Recent turbulences 
related to the global financial crisis, which seem to have a significant impact on the banking 
system of Kazakhstan (the driving force of FDI regionalization!), raise some questions 
regarding the viability of the model. Therefore the coming few years could be quite 
interesting from the point of view of informal regional integration in Central Asia. 
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